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RECENT DECISIONS
By this decision the Commission must now adopt the absolute
rule set up by the Court which restricts the flexibility existing under
earlier Commission decisions. The Commission's original determina-
tion in the Aramco matter was to prevent unfair discrimination in
Aramco's New York offices but to permit this discrimination where
a visa is necessary for an applicant to go to Saudi Arabia. It will be
interesting to observe whether the State Department will take any
affirmative action, if and when an appeal is taken in this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GRAND JURY-AssERTION OF PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION NOT REQUIRED OF PROSPECTrvE
DEFENANT.-Defendant was subpoenaed to appear before a grand
jury, and after being examined, was indicted for conspiracy and for
giving bribes to public officers. Pursuant to Section 149 of the Judi-
ciary Law,' he moved directly to the Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, which dismissed the indictment on the ground that he had
acquired immunity from prosecution for the crime to which he had
been compelled to testify, even though Section 2447 of the New York
Penal Law 2 provides for a grant of immunity to a witness only when
he has claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant
had at no time claimed his privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that since defendant was before the grand jury as a pros-
pective defendant, and not merely as a witness, he could not be com-
pelled to testify at all. Since the defendant had been compelled to
testify, his privilege against self-incrimination had been violated, and,
consequently, the indictment predicated on his testimony was void.
The Court of Appeals specifically left open the question whether the
violation of defendant's constitutional privilege also afforded him an
immunity from subsequent prosecution. People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d
214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
Section 2447 of the Penal Law was enacted to correct some of
the deficiencies found in statutes which preceded it.3 These defi-
ciencies were, for the most part, products of two conflicting philos-
ophies; on the one band there prevailed the idea that "no person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
'N.Y. JuDriAyY LAw § 149(2) (Supp. 1959) provides: "A motion in-
volving a matter pending before such extraordinary special or trial term shall
be made returnable at such term, or, at the option of the moving party, at
a term of the appellate division of the supreme court in the department in
which such . . . term is being held."2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2447 (Supp. 1959).
3 See 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 68, THIED REPORT, N.Y. SrATE CRIME CoMr-
missION 14-15 (1953).
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self . . . ," 4 while on the other it was felt that the state is entitled
to a man's evidence.5
In 1857, Congress passed an immunity statute 6 which provided
that one could not be held criminally liable "for any fact or act
touching which he shall be required to testify before . . . Con-
gress. . . . , 7 Because the liberality of the statute proved respon-
sible for many abuses,8 it was amended to read, "testimony ... shall
not be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against such
witness. . . ." ' Subsequent legislation 10 in this area was patterned
after this amended portion of the original act. The distinction be-
tween "any fact or act touching" .and "testimony" was fully realized
when the Supreme Court, in Counselman v. Hitchcock," held that
"a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to which the question
relates." 12 This principle was followed in New York ' 3 when the
Court of Appeals found that Section 342 of the Penal Law was not
co-extensive 14 with the privilege against self-incrimination..
The problem of the legislature in drafting section 2447 was
clear; it had to create an immunity which was absolute in the spirit
of the Counselmian decision and rigid enough to preclude the abuses
which characterized the 1857 law.' 5 The statute provides that in
4 U.S. CousT. amend. V. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. Grand jury pro-
ceedings are criminal cases within the meaning of the Constitutional prohibi-
tions. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
58 WIGmORE, Evn icE § 2193(2) (3d ed. 1940).6 Act of Jan. 26, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155.
7Act of Jan. 26, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 156.
8 See Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes,
22 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 447, 453-54 (1954).
9 18 U.S.C. §3486 (1958).
10 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 382, § 3, 25 Stat. 855; Act of Mar. 3,
1887, ch. 345, § 2, 24 Stat. 488; Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat 37.
"1142 U.S. 547 (1892).
12Id. at 586. The Court reasoned that if a statute only excludes the use
of testimony in a subsequent prosecution, it would still be within the power
of a prosecutor to use the testimony to obtain other evidence which in turn
could be used against the witness. However, "any fact or act touching" would
seem to exclude all possibilities.
:s People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253, 68 N.E. 353 (1903).
14 "Co-extensive" is the term usually employed to define the relation the
immunity must bear to the privilege it replaces. See Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 565 (1892) ; People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, supra note 13,
at 266.
15 See People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595, 603, 127 N.E.2d 592, 596 (1955).
Prior to the enactment of § 2447, the courts generally construed the
then existing immunity statutes to give an automatic immunity to prospective
defendants. As a result, prosecutors often inadvertently conferred immunity
upon persons later found to be criminals; § 2447 was designed to shift
the burden from the prosecutor to the witness, by making him assert his con-
stitutional privilege before obtaining an immunity. In other words, the claim
of privilege would act as a signal to the prosecutor; he could then either grant
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order to obtain the immunity 16 one must: (1) make a good faith claim
of privilege, (2) be directed by a competent authority to testify,
(3) testifyA' The statute further provides that an immunity may
be obtained only in the manner prescribed by the statute itself.18
In the instant case,1 9 the defendant made no attempt to comply
with the terms of the statute. In dismissing the indictment against
him, the Court held that a prospective defendant "may not be called
and examined before a Grand Jury and, if he is, his constitutionally-
conferred privilege against self incrimination is deemed violated even
though he does not claim or assert the privilege." 20 The Court also
stated that "the statute does not apply . . . to a defendant or to one
who is in the shoes of a defendant, insofar as it provides that the
burden is cast upon him of claiming privilege, and any attempt to
invoke it against such a person would offend against the constitu-
tional provision .... [S]ince the right granted by the Constitution
is automatically conferred, section 2447 is . . .unconstitutional." 21
The Court's position is consistent with what has traditionally
been the lav in New York.2 2  The reasoning is based on the propo-
sition that a defendant in a criminal case cannot possibly be asked
a relevant question which will not incriminate him,23 hence, any
attempt 24 to make him talk operates automatically as a violation of
the immunity and continue the investigation, or switch to a more innocuous
line of questioning and "keep" the witness as a future defendant.
16N.Y. PENAL LAW §2447(1) (Supp. 1959). "In any investigation or
proceeding where, by express provision of statute, a competent authority is
authorized to confer immunity, if a person refuses to answer a question ...
on the ground that he may be incriminated thereby, and ...an order is made
. .. that such person answer the question . . . such person shall comply ...
If such person complies with the order, and if, but for this section, he would
have been privileged to withhold the answer . . . immunity shall be con-
ferred. . . ." Ibid.27 1953 LwG. Doc. No. 68, THIRD REPORT, N.Y. STATE CRIME CoMa!MISSIoN 15
(1953).
Is N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2447(4) (Supp. 1959). "Immunity shall not be con-
ferred upon any person except in accordance with the provisions of this section."
Ibid.
19 People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166
(1959).
20 Id. at 216-17, 160 N.E.2d at 469, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 167. (Emphasis added.)
21 Id. at 217, 160 N.E.2d at 470, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
22 See, e.g., People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st
Dep't 1908); People v. Dooling, 14 Misc. 2d 907, 180 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Erie
County Ct. 1958); People v. Rauch, 140 Misc. 691, 251 N.Y. Supp. 454 (Ct.
Gen. Sess. 1931); People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 358, 128 N.Y. Supp. 524 (Sup.
Ct. 1911).
238 WIGmom, EvimNcE §2276(2) (3d ed. 1940).
24 Regardless of whether the defendant may be questioned, he can probably
be made to appear and be put under oath. See O'Connell v. United States,
40 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 1930); People ex rel. Hummel v. Davy, 105 App.
Div. 598, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1037 (1st Dep't 1905) ; 8 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2268(2)
(3d ed. 1940).
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his constitutional privilege. 25 A very acute problem arises, however,
when a party testifies before a grand jury, because very often at the
inception of the investigation his status has not been clarified. It is
possible that he may be a witness or a defendant, and it may well be
that at a given point in an investigation, the prosecutor himself does
not know. In enacting section 2447, the legislature sought to relieve
the prosecutor of the burden of guessing whether the party would
turn out to be a witness or a defendant.2 6 If the rule that the ques-
tioning of a defendant results in a violation of the defendant's con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination is to include prospective
defendants before grand juries as well as defendants in criminal cases,
the effectiveness of section 2447 has been severely curtailed.
The Court specifically left unanswered the question whether the
violation of the constitutional privilege also cloaked the defendant
with an immunity from subsequent prosecution.2 7  Some courts have
answered the question in the affirmative.28  Better reasoning, how-
,ever, leads to the opposite conclusion. 29
The immunity statute, enacted to make available evidence which
would otherwise be unobtainable, 30 and the constitutional privilege
are pari inateria.'1 The statute is a substitute for the constitutional
privilege, but only on a quid pro quo basis.32 Since the immunity is
authorized conditionally upon and in exchange for the relinquishment
of the privilege,3 3 the privilege itself must be claimed before the im-
munity can come into being. 4
An "automatic" immunity would be not only contrary to au-
thority, but against the public interest. The immunity statute is not
intended as a gratuitous offer to criminals, and it should not be re-
garded as such. Clearly, the Court of Appeals should have answered
the immunity question in the negative.
25 See cases cited note 22 supra. But if he takes the stand voluntarily,
has he waived the privilege? See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276 (3d ed. 1940).
26 See 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 68, THIRD REPORT, N.Y. STATE CRIME CoMr-
MIlSSION 14-15 (1953) ; see also note 15 sapra.
27 People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 217, 160 N.E.2d 468, 470, 189 N.Y.S.2d
166, 168 (1959).
28 See People v. Steuding, 7 A.D.2d 566, 185 N.Y.S.2d 34 (3d Dep't 1959);
People ex rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282, 18 N.Y.S.2d 947 (2d
Dep't 1940).29 See generally 8 WIGMioRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2282-84 (3d ed. 1940).
30 See Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913).
31 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943). See Note, Compulsory
Self-Incrmination and Statutory Immunity, 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 330, 332
(1959).
32 United States v. Monia, supra note 31, at 441 (dissenting opinion).
33 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2282, at 510 (3d ed. 1940).
34 Id. at 509-11.
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